On 26 September 2026 one agent session produced ten runs. Each run ends in an execution hash, and the ten hashes fold into a single Merkle root that three independent timestamp authorities signed. This page rebuilds that tree in your browser from the real hashes, edits one run to see exactly which hashes break, and proves a single run with four sibling hashes.
Show how ten real runs fold into one timestamped root, why one edited run is caught, and how one run can be proven without revealing the others.
1. The evidence is the ten execution hashes and three timestamp tokens of the Agent Staircase session of 26 September 2026. This page holds the hashes alone. The runs' inputs and outputs are not in it, so it can show how the hashes fold and what a change does, and it cannot re-run any run.
2. The folding rule is the one build_session_receipt uses in the MCP worker: SHA-256 over the two child hashes written as lowercase hex text and joined, a binary tree, and the last node of an odd level paired with itself. The page applies that rule through the shared verifier kit and reproduces the anchored root from the ten hashes.
3. Two of the three timestamps chain to roots pinned in this page, DigiCert and FreeTSA. The Sigstore token's imprint and signature check, but its root is not pinned here, so its chain shows as not checked. The timestamp verifier in this page checks one certificate hop and does not look up revocation, so a full audit would also use the Anchor Suite verifier. An auditor who trusts nothing here can check each token with openssl ts -verify.
4. An inclusion proof shows the hashes of neighbouring runs. A hash does not reveal a run's inputs, though anyone who can guess the inputs can test the guess against it. The tamper and proof views run only in this page's memory and nothing is sent or stored.
Evidence from github.com/PostOakLabs/ainumbers · runs in your browser · Zero PII · CC BY 4.0 · Post Oak Labs