Verifies an extract's Merkle inclusion against a root only when that root is anchored by a recognized source: a recognized OCG artifact/chain envelope (dogfood, our own receipt format), or an external anchor (RFC 3161 timestamp, OpenTimestamps, Sigstore transparency log, or an on-chain commitment composed via VR-1). A self-produced root with no recognized anchor is explicitly refused, not silently passed. The universal self-produced hash-chain explorer stays dead, and this refusal is why.
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What this does NOT prove
Inclusion of one leaf under an anchored root does not validate the extract's contents beyond that leaf hash, does not prove the committed set is complete, and does not extend freshness beyond the anchor's own time semantics. An unanchored, self-produced root is refused outright: it is never treated as verified evidence. Driven by amended AS 1105 (FY2026) and the AICPA practice aid on not relying on unanchored chain explorers.
Extract
Anchor Source
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Determination
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Anchored
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Root Match
Anchored inclusion check
What was NOT proven
Compliance Flags
Provenance
Clean-room RFC 6962 (Certificate Transparency) domain-separated Merkle-tree pattern: an independent implementation, no code copied from any CT-log or Merkle library. On-chain anchoring composes with VR-1 (verify_eth_state_proof, art-279); this kernel never re-verifies an EIP-1186 state proof itself.
⚠ DECISION-SUPPORT DRAFT. Not an audit and not a PCAOB opinion. This tool verifies inclusion under an anchored root only; see "What was NOT proven" above.