IDV/KYC Session Evidence Chain

Note (dated 2026-08-04): a chain composes independent computations performed in an analytical order. No step's output is carried into the next step by the execution model; each step computes from its own declared inputs. This is true of every chain on this site, including chains whose per-step copy below reads as a data handoff.

Run a structural C2PA provenance check on an identity-verification capture, then bind the same verdict into a hash-chained IDV/KYC session receipt that binds capture-chain digest, injection, liveness, document, and device verdicts into one tamper-evident record. Every field is labeled asserted: the chain attests the session record as declared, never detection quality or subject genuineness. Zero PII by construction, client-side only.

OpenChainGraph · 2 Steps compliance control Hash-Anchored §4 chain_depth:2 Client-Side · Zero PII

Chain Stages · 2 Steps

1 ROOT node

Camera-Provenance Check art-361-camera-provenance-check

C2PA manifest structural verdict and digitalSourceType/trainedAlgorithmicMedia flag feed the session receipt builder's capture-chain field

MCP Call · check_camera_provenance

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "check_camera_provenance",
    "arguments": {}
  },
  "id": 1
}

↓

2 TERMINAL node

IDV/KYC Session Evidence Receipt Builder art-359-idv-session-receipt-builder

Hash-chained IDV/KYC session receipt: final stage, binding capture-chain digest with injection/liveness/document/device verdicts

MCP Call · build_idv_session_receipt

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "build_idv_session_receipt",
    "arguments": {}
  },
  "id": 1
}

Scope Fence · What This Chain Does Not Prove

Every verifier-sourced field in the receipt is labeled asserted. This chain attests that a session record was declared with these values: it never attests detection quality, liveness-model accuracy, or subject genuineness. The camera-provenance check is structural only (manifest well-formedness, hard-binding hash, signature reference); it makes no trust-list or chain-of-trust claim. Consumes only digests, booleans, and scores; rejects any raw-data-shaped input (images, biometric templates) before compute proceeds. See the IDV/KYC session evidence guide for the full fence and injection-attack context.

Question: Before we accept this selfie capture for onboarding, does its C2PA manifest assert a live camera shot or AI-generated media? Run the AINumbers MCP tool `run_chain` with {"chain":"idv-session-evidence"} and read `art-361-camera-provenance-check.provenance_label`. Re-run with `inputs` for `art-361-camera-provenance-check`, reusing the values that result echoed, with `assertions` changed so the first action declares trainedAlgorithmicMedia. Compare the same field. Verify: call `verify_execution_hash` (https://mcp.ainumbers.co/mcp) with `claimed_hash` set to `composite_execution_hash` and the full `composite_artifact`. Ledger, for a human re-check: https://ledger.ainumbers.co/ PII rule: send synthetic or anonymised inputs only. The MCP server runs these kernels and logs no payloads. Chain page: https://ainumbers.co/chaingraph/chains/idv-session-evidence.html

IDV/KYC Session Evidence Chain

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